The copula

What are the semantic differences between “white swan” and “swans are white”? (a) One of the semantic differences is that “white swan” is non-propositional and “swans are white” is propositional. That is, “white swan” is neither true nor false but “swans are white” is the opposite: It’s either true or false. (b) The other semantic difference is that “white swan” asks you to imagine something that’s both white and a swan and “swans are white” tells you that if you see a white, then you’ll see something white: the swan. “White swan,” being non-propositional, doesn’t tell you anything about, say, “black swan,” but “swans are white,” being propositional, tells you that “swans aren’t black.”

That is:

  1. “White swan” brings together in your imagination whiteness and swanness.
  2. “Swans are white” not only brings together in your imagination whiteness and swanness but also proposes that whiteness and swanness go together.

(It’s important to point out that “swans are white” tells you that with swanness comes whiteness, not the opposite: that with whiteness comes swanness. That is, s < w, not w < s.)

With the double labels ab, ~ab, a~b, and ~a~b:

  1. It’s possible to bring together in your imagination ab, ~ab, a~b, or ~a~b.
  2. It’s also possible to propose that ab, ~ab, a~b, or ~a~b go together. (That’s what the copula does.)

The clannish holdouts

In The WEIRDest People in the World (2020), Joseph Henrich argues that over a millennium, the Catholic Church simplified the kinship system of the West from clannishness to the nuclear family. People stopped marrying in a narrow circle, which results in narrow genetic loyalty—clannishness—and started marrying in a wide circle, which results in wide genetic loyalty. Cooperation scaled, and the West, with its big-scale civilization, took over.

Henrich doesn’t argue this, but my understanding is:

  1. There have always been clannish holdouts (e.g., royalty, the aristocracy, the Jews, the mafia).
  2. The clannish holdouts end up with a lot of power.

What was monarchy but that? That is, what was monarchy but the clannish holdouts controlling the non-clannish? The non-nuclear families controlling the nuclear families?

And what was the aftermath of the World Wars but the end of royalty and the aristocracy?

My work as either artificial language or notation

When introducing the technical side of my work, I used to lead with: “I’m designing an artificial language.” Now I lead with: “I’m designing notation for logic and linguistics à la the best mathematical notation: arithmetical, algebraic, etc.” I used to get bad reactions, and now I get good reactions. Why? I’ve been working on my artificial language, my logico-linguistic notational system, for a long time. I started in my late teens. In changing the term that I lead with from “artificial language,” which makes most people skeptical, to “notation,” which doesn’t, I didn’t change anything about the substance, about what I’ve been working on for so long. I just changed my strategy for explaining what I’m working on.

Why it worked to change the term:

  1. It sounds utopian, even schizophrenic, to be serious about designing an “artificial language,” to seriously believe that designing an “artificial language” could revolutionize communication. By contrast, it sounds modest to say that you’re designing “notation.” It sounds scientific.
  2. In designing an artificial language, it would be possible to prioritize the phonological and orthographical aesthetics, to prioritize making the artificial language sound and look beautiful. In designing notation, however, (a) there’s no phonology—the term “notation” refers to +, -, and other international written symbols, their countless spoken counterparts throughout the world (e.g., “plus,” “minus”) notwithstanding, for those spoken symbols aren’t notation but natural language—and (b) although it would be possible to prioritize the orthographical aesthetics, people associate the term “notation” not with art but with science. My project has no phonology, and my artistic vision for the orthography is secondary to my scientific vision. Thus, the term “artificial language” is more misleading association-wise, and the term “notation” is less misleading.

Beyond logic, linguistics, and logico-linguistics

Besides (a) using British empiricism as a foundation for Austrian economics, (b) using that British-empiricist Austrian economics as a model for how to do logic, linguistics, and logico-linguistics, and then (c) using mathematics as a model for how to put the insights that I come up with in those fields into notation à la The Laws of Thought, George Boole (1854), I want to:

  1. Explain how the natural order of civilization uses wheat, rice, milk, tea, coffee, tobacco, and other psychoactives—yes, wheat, rice, and milk are psychoactives, albeit difficult to introspect as such—in order to adapt the mind, which evolved for the pre-civilizational world, to civilization. If you (a) fast periodically, (b) eat, say, only meat, only fruit, or only meat and fruit, and (c) get a lot of exercise outside in the sun, especially in a socially meaningful way, then you’ll be healthy. The problem, though, is that your mind (and indeed your body too) will no longer be adapted to civilization.
  2. More generally, found a new kind of field about health: a field that’s not only about the above (i.e., the natural order of psychoactives) but also about the natural order of the body and its signals to the mind.
  3. Explain male sexual psychology, female sexual psychology, and how the natural order adapts those psychologies to civilization.
  4. More generally, work on the most controversial psychological and sociological questions: the questions of sex, race, and other unchoosable identities.
  5. Explain why there used to be more people like me, people with an interest in the foundational questions of logic, mathematics, etc. And in doing so, tell my story: the story of somebody out of place.
  6. Tell the story of “my people,” whoever they are—that’s one of the questions that I want to answer—especially the story of the World Wars and their aftermath. The World Wars were a catastrophe for the West.

Logic, linguistics, and logico-linguistics

Some of my goals:

  1. I not only want to contribute to logic and linguistics but also answer the question of what the relationship is between logic and linguistics.
  2. I want to answer the question of what the relationship is between mathematical notation and natural language (especially arithmetical and algebraic notation).
  3. I want to (a) integrate Austrian economics, especially Misesian-Hayekian economics, with British empiricism, and then (b) found a field of logic, linguistics, and logico-linguistics which is epistemologically the same as British-empiricist Austrian economics. That is, I want to do logic, linguistics, and logico-linguistics in the spirit of Misesian-Hayekian-Humean economics.
  4. I want to design a certain kind of artificial language and in doing so, abstract out the logical substructure of natural language. (If you understand my artificial language, then you’ll also understand my insights in logic, linguistics, and logico-linguistics.)

In testing whether my insights in logic, linguistics, and logico-linguistics are right (including the British-empiricist-Austrian-economics-like epistemology of those fields), I’ll use those insights not only for (a) designing the artificial language—if the artificial language doesn’t work, then I’m wrong—but also (b) studying Japanese, German, etc. That is, the rubber will hit the road in at least two places.

The artificial-language software

The software would:

  1. Be a better way to learn languages (which would be the direct goal).
  2. (Indirectly) teach the user how to abstract out the logical substructure of natural language (in practice).
  3. (Indirectly) teach the user the skeleton for an artificial language.
  4. With enough users, (indirectly) flesh out the skeleton of the artificial language.

Imagine that you’re studying Japanese with flashcard software (e.g., Anki), with the front of each flashcard being the Japanese (whether spoken, written, or both) and the back of each flashcard being the English translation (again whether spoken, written, or both). My software would also be flashcard software, the difference being:

  1. The software would guess what it should test you on. Its guesses would get better over time, and eventually it would be able to guess how much vocabulary you know, how much grammar you know, how good your ear is, etc. (That would be motivating because the software would show your language-learning progress in real time. The more you immerse and the more you study the flashcards, the faster you see your vocabulary growing etc.)
  2. The back of each flashcard wouldn’t be an English translation but a translation into the artificial language.

On #2: Imagine again that you’re studying Japanese. You try to understand the Japanese on the front of the flashcard, and then you check the back in order to check whether you were right. By default, the software would show you only the translation into the 1-dimensional modality of the artificial language. You’d have various options:

  1. Generate the 2-dimensional-modality artificial-language transliteration.
  2. Hover your cursor over anything in the Japanese on the front of the card or the artificial-language translation/transliteration on the back of the card, which would show you which chunks, whether bigger or smaller, in the Japanese, correspond to which chunks, again whether bigger or smaller, in either the 1-dimensional translation or the corresponding 2-dimensional transliteration.
  3. Click any of those chunks, whether a word, phrase, or sentence, in order to AI-generate a visualization of a prototypical example. Click again in order to generate another visualization. Gradually, the visualizations would go from more prototypical to less.

Besides letting the user study flashcards, the software would also let users input the 1-dimensional and 2-dimensional modalities of the artificial language themselves in order to write either to themselves or other users. Most importantly, they could message other users in artificial language (not to mention English, Japanese, or any other natural language popular enough to be easy to include). With enough users who (indirectly) know the artificial language, an international Republic of Letters could come about. If, say, a monolingual Japanese person learns English with the software and a monolingual Korean person learns German, then they have no shared natural language. The artificial language would be the easiest way to communicate, which could naturally make the artificial language into their lingua franca.

The artificial language could also just end up being (like arithmetical, algebraic, and other mathematical notation) a useful supplement to natural language: an international notational system (for laying bare the logical substructure of natural language). (Another possibility: It could also just end up being a tool for formalizing logic, linguistics, and the relationship between logic and linguistics.)

But how would I make the artificial language more natural? The software would let the users add new symbols to the open-class vocabulary, which would let them naturally change the artificial language in practice.

Hume, Mises, and Humean-Misesian linguistics

My most significant early influences were David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739) and Ludwig von Mises, Human Action (1940). The former author and book are part of the school of thought called “British empiricism,” and the latter author and book are part of the school of thought called “Austrian economics.” Nothing has influenced me more than (a) reading Hume in my late teens, (b) reading Mises at the same time, and then (c) realizing that I could use Humean phenomenalism as a foundation for Misesian economics.

Interestingly, though, it wasn’t that I wanted to use Hume’s insights in order to put Misesian economics on a stronger foundation for the sake of economics. It was that I was working on an artificial language, a language natural-language-like in some aspects but not others, and nothing had been more helpful to me in that endeavor than putting Hume and Mises together.

Ultimately, I decided to:

  1. Put Misesian economics on a foundation of Humean phenomenalism. That is, integrate Austrian economics with British empiricism.
  2. Use that Humean-Misesian phenomenalism-economics synthesis as a model science. Build a science analogous to that model science except for linguistics.
  3. Use that new kind of linguistics in order to better build the artificial language.

Subjective and objective propositions

The different subjective propositions “he saw the mailman ring the doorbell” and “she heard the mailman ring the doorbell” both reduce to the same objective proposition “the mailman rang the doorbell.” Subjective propositions specify the agent (e.g., “he,” “she”) and the sensory modality (e.g., “saw,” “heard”). Objective propositions, by contrast, specify neither the agent nor the sensory modality.

One of my goals for the notational system that I’m working on is to distinguish between subjective and objective propositions. Subjective propositions, which will be marked as such, will take:

  1. One or more agents (e.g., “he,” “she,” “John”)
  2. One or more sensory modalities per agent (e.g., his visual modality, her auditory modality)

From the subjective to the objective:

  1. More subjective. I both believe that I saw and believe that I heard the mailman ring the doorbell.
  2. Less subjective. Thus, I believe that the mailman rang the doorbell.
  3. More subjective. You both believe that you saw and believe that you heard the mailman ring the doorbell.
  4. Less subjective. Thus, you believe that the mailman rang the doorbell.
  5. Objective. Thus, the mailman rang the doorbell.

Physics and universalism

For example, it’s possible for me to hear footsteps behind me and then imagine, vividly enough such that I believe what I’m imagining, that I’m seeing somebody walking behind me. That is, it’s possible for (a) my auditory sense, which is one of my sensory modalities, to pick up on what’s happening directly, (b) my visual sense to not pick up on what’s happening directly, and (c) my mind to use the auditory information, directly given in the present hypothetical example, in order to fill in the missing visual information. Ultimately, I associate certain auditory information so strongly with certain visual information that getting the auditory information is enough to assume the visual information.

The different sensory modalities (e.g., the auditory sense, the visual sense, the tactile sense) are different ways of learning about the same world. Whether I hear a burglar break into my house (without seeing him) and then I call the police or I see the burglar break into my house (without hearing him) and then I call the police, what (purportedly) happened in the world is the same: A burglar broke into my house, and then I called the police. The subjective experience of hearing something without seeing it is different than the subjective experience of seeing something without hearing it, but what’s objective is the same. That is, the mental experience is different, but what’s physical is the same.

Imagine that you hear something surprising without seeing it. What would you do? You’d probably try to corroborate the surprising auditory information with visual information, tactile information, etc. You’d also probably try to get other people to corroborate what you heard etc.

That’s a lot of redundant information: my visual sense, another person’s visual sense, my auditory sense, another person’s auditory sense, etc.

Physics, being the study of the physical world, is a radically corroborative system. There are deaf people, blind people, people who are both deaf and blind, men (who usually have a worse sense of smell), women (who usually have a better sense of smell), etc. Physics doesn’t study the different ways of learning about the world. It studies the world. Whether you’re deaf, blind, both deaf and blind, somebody with a bad sense of smell, or somebody with a good sense of smell, physics tells you about the same world. In that way, physics is one of the most radically universalistic systems. In fact, physicalism (which is the metaphysical position of a lot of people with a background in physics, understandably) is in effect a kind of universalism.

Physics studies not only “visible” but also “invisible” light, not only “audible” but also “inaudible” sound. The electromagnetic spectrum, for instance, which is a model in physics that I’ll take on faith for now—I haven’t looked into the relevant physics myself yet—is a lot wider than what we as humans can sense without technology. We use technology in order to “see” X rays, FM radio waves, AM radio waves, etc.

Even an illiterate farmer a thousand years ago, though, would take the first small step toward physics when thinking to himself that his bloodhound has a much better sense of smell than he does.

Wheat, Christianity, and artificial selection

If wheat really does make people better at mentalizing, and if wheat really does go hand in glove with Christianity for that reason, then consider how cultural evolution would work here. Christianity, being a powerful tool for big-scale cooperation, is “selected for” because big-scale cooperation wins against small-scale cooperation, and thus wheat, being something that makes it easier for people to believe in God, be Christian, and thus fit into that big-scale cooperation system, is “selected for.” The groups that didn’t emphasize wheat in their diet as much wouldn’t have had as much conviction about, say, the Christian “contingent afterlife”—they wouldn’t have been as “schizophrenically sure” of that unseeable, unknowable “fact”—which would have made them less likely to follow the big-scale-cooperation-related Christian rules.

It’s important to take into account, though, the dosage. It’s not only possible for the people in a group to change how much wheat they eat, which would change the dosage. It’s also possible to change the wheat itself. That’s where artificial selection comes in. As long as better mentalizing (for the sake of Christianity) was being (naturally) “selected for” on the group level, the groups that stumbled onto wheat artificial-selection patterns that changed wheat in order to make it even better at making people better at mentalizing would have been (naturally) “selected for.” Artificial selection is powerful—just look at dogs, for instance—and thus it’s clear that Christian civilization’s wheat may well be very different than whatever wheat was originally.

The argument generalizes: A group’s diet is likely to fit hand in glove with the group’s culture (in how the diet affects psychology), especially if the group is successful. Our hunter-gatherer ancestors (at least when they had the luxury of plenty of food to go around) were able to choose whether or not to eat, say, meat, but they weren’t able to change the meat iself. In civilization, though, because of the agricultural revolution, there’s artificial selection. Groups are able to artificially select domesticated animals, and the artificial-selection patterns are themselves (naturally) “selected for.” Same for domesticated plants.

(Besides wheat, dairy is another example of a strongly psychoactive food, having opioids too, and civilization has strongly artificially selected cows. That artificial selection probably has not only economic but also psychological import.)

By analogy, consider that whether it’s light or dark, hot or cold, affects psychology. Our hunter-gatherer ancestors had less control over that, but in civilization, we have more control. Cafes, for instance, are dark and cold (relatively speaking), because that’s conducive to studiousness. In the same way, food affects psychology, especially strongly psychoactive foods like wheat, rice, and dairy, and civilization has taken control.